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I. INTRODUCTION
In January 2010, research by the OpenNet Initiative1 revealed that 
more than half a billion of all Internet users worldwide are currently 
being censored.2  Thirteen nations currently employ “pervasive filtering,”3 
seven additional nations employ “substantial filtering,”4 and roughly
thirty-six nations employ some varying degree of “nominal filtering.”5 
Most discussions about Internet censorship focus heavily on repressive
regimes,6 and while “focusing on these ugly regimes is popular, it can 
blind us to other developments.”7  Censorship is no longer a tactic reserved 
for authoritarian administrations interested in silencing political dissent.
Internet censorship has now become a method explored by democratic 
nations seeking to regulate illegal activities conducted online.8 
The task of developing a workable filtration system has proven
difficult, and often futile, in democratic nations as a result of the watchful
eyes of concerned citizens and civil liberties organizations.  Although 
1. OpenNet Initiative (ONI) is a collaborative partnership of three institutions: the 
Citizen Lab at the Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto, the Berkman
Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University, and the SecDev Group (Ottawa). 
ONI investigates and analyzes Internet surveillance and filtering practices across the
globe. See OpenNet Initiative, About Oni (Jan. 2010), http://opennet.net/about-oni. 
2. Jillian C. York, More than half a billion Internet users are being filtered
worldwide, OPENNET INITIATIVE (Jan. 2010), http://opennet.net/blog/2010/01/more-half-
a-billion-internet-users-are-being-filtered-worldwide [hereinafter ONI].
3. Pervasive filtering is defined by ONI as “characterized by both its depth—a 
blocking regime that blocks a large portion of the targeted content in a given category—
and its breadth—a blocking regime that includes filtering in several categories in a given 
theme.” See id. at 112. 
4. Substantial filtering is defined by ONI as “[having] either depth or breadth: 
either a number of categories are subject to a medium level of filtering, or a low level of 
filtering is carried out across many categories.” Id.
5. Nominal or selective filtering is defined by ONI as “narrowly targeted filtering
that blocks a small number of specific sites across a few categories or filtering that
targets a single category or issue.” Id. 
6. This assertion is evidenced by two LexisWeb Searches: the first search 
“internet censorship” AND “China” yielded 31,446 results (last visited Aug. 31, 2011) 
while the second search “internet censorship” AND “democracy” yielded only 23,036 
results (last visited Aug. 31, 2011). 
7. Robert Boorstin, Google Director of Corporate and Policy Communications, 
Address at the Geneva Summit for Human Rights Tolerance and Democracy (Mar. 9, 
2010) (transcript available at http://blog.unwatch.org). 
8. Joshua Keating, The List: Look Who’s Censoring the Internet Now, FOREIGN
POLICY (Mar. 4, 2009), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/03/23/the_list_look 
_whos_censoring_the_internet_now?page=0,0. 
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proposals in many democratic nations have been criticized and stagnated 
as a result of the stigma associated with censorship, it is apparent that
new proposals will continue to surface through governments eager to
curtail illegal activities otherwise capable of flourishing with impunity in
the robust cyber realm.9 
This Comment investigates past censorship schemes proposed and 
implemented by selected democratic administrations, in order to develop 
an improved framework and accompanying infrastructure that may
accomplish the goals that these policies envisioned, but failed to achieve.10 
The difficulty of this undertaking is in developing the intermediate and 
legally defensible parameters under which a regulation scheme can
endure and gain support in a democratic society.  The greater difficulty 
lies in developing a system that can accomplish these objectives in the
burgeoning and ever-changing cyber realm.
The challenges posed by Internet activity are novel ones, and the 
legitimacy of the actions taken in response is equally uncertain.11  This 
Comment examines the “first wave” of censorship approaches that have
been drafted, proposed, and adopted by democratic nations, focusing on 
Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom.  By evaluating the 
censorship policies proposed by each of these nations, this Comment
identifies and examines the successful as well as the ineffectual elements
of each of these policies, in order to develop general guidelines under
which a democratic Internet regulation scheme may one day legitimately
operate.
9. See United States and Canada. OPENNET INITIATIVE (2010), http://opennet.net/ 
research/regions/namerica.
10. The primary focus of this comment is not on censorship targeting copyright 
infringement online.  For a discussion of this and related issues see Graeme W. Austin,
Social Policy Choices and Choice of Law for Copyright Infringement in Cyberspace, 79 
OR. L. REV. 575 (2000).  See also Peter S. Menell, Can our Current Conception of
Copyright Law Survive the Internet Age?: Envisioning Copyright Law’s Digital Future, 
46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63 (2002–03). 
11. “[T]he use of technology to exert control over internet users frequently
challenges tenets associated with the rule of law concerning both the process for and 
content of norms governing behavior.”  T. J. McIntyre & Colin David Scott, Internet  
Filtering: Rhetoric, Legitimacy, Accountability and Responsibility, in REGULATING 
TECHNOLOGIES 109, 111 (R. Brownsword & K. Yeung, eds., Oxford, Hart Publishing 
2008). 
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Crimes committed with the aid of the Internet are on the rise,12 as is 
the number of nations responding by developing and adopting Internet 
censorship policies.13  In recent years, governments around the world 
have been confronted with the difficult and complex issues that arise
when attempting to develop methods with which to monitor and restrict 
the spread of harmful, and often illegal, content on the Internet.14  While
all governments have been faced with novel complications posed by the 
prevalence of the World Wide Web, democratic nations have had to
confront the uniquely difficult matter of balancing the need to regulate 
illegal material, while simultaneously preserving the inherently democratic 
freedoms upon which they are built.15 
The Internet and its various forms of information spreading, pose 
special, unprecedented difficulties for governments attempting to restrict 
access to illegal, harmful, and in some cases, politically dissenting content. 
Due to the unique nature of these threats and the unparalleled nature of
the medium with which they are spread, governments have attempted to
reconcile their inability to control or punish the content hosted overseas 
by adopting filtering policies that enable them to prevent this content
from being accessible to their citizens.16  Attempts to regulate content 
hosted abroad have been emerging in various formats, and in order to be 
effective, have all incorporated some form of cooperation from Internet 
service providers (ISPs), whether through legal mandate17 or informal 
pressure.18
 12. Janis Wolak, Trends in Arrests of Online Predators, CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN
RESEARCH CTR. 1, 2 (2009), available at http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/pdf/CV194.pdf. 
13. ONI, supra note 2. 
14. Internet Censorship: Law & Policy Around the World, ELECTRONIC FRONTIERS
AUSTRALIA [EFA], http://www.efa.org.au/Issues/Censor/cens3.html (last updated Mar. 
28, 2002). 
15. See generally John G. Palfrey, Jr. & Robert Rogoyski, The Move to the Middle: 
The Enduring Threat of “Harmful” Speech to the End-to-End Principle, 21 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 31 (2006) (describing recent changes in Internet regulation practices).
16. Mary Rundle & Malcolm Birdling, Filtering and the International System: A 
Question of Commitment, in  ACCESS DENIED: THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL
INTERNET FILTERING 73, 90 (Ronald J. Deibert et al. eds., 2008). 
17. See generally Jennifer Dudley-Nicholson, Australia’s Compulsory Internet
Filtering “Costly, Ineffective,” THE COURIER-MAIL, (Oct. 29, 2008), http://www.news. 
com.au/technology/story/0,25642,24569656-5014239,00.html. 
18. See Frank Fisher, Caught in the Web, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 17, 2008), http:// 
www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jan/17/caughtintheweb (detailing the UK 
government’s effort to suppress certain content by demanding that ISPs voluntarily opt 
into a system that has not been discussed or debated by the legislature). 
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A. How the Internet Differs from Its Predecessors 
There are a multitude of characteristics that differentiate “online
media” from its predecessors of print and broadcast media. The
pervasiveness of the Internet has grown at an unprecedented rate.19  The
world population was an estimated 6.93 billion as of March 2011, of
which an estimated 2.096 billion Internet users.20  From 2000 to 2011,
Internet usage among the world’s population increased by an astonishing 
480.4%.21 
In addition to its universal prevalence, the Internet has enabled new
forms of human interaction as a result of the ease and speed with which 
information can be accessed and spread across the globe.22  In 1798 it
took 62 days for news of the Battle of Nile23 to travel 2,073 miles in
order to reach London.24  This information traveled across the globe at a 
speed of 1.4 miles per hour.25  Nearly a century later, in 1891, it took 
only one day for news of the Nobi Earthquake in Japan to travel 5,916
miles in order to reach London, attaining a speed of 246 miles per 
hour.26  Today, this information can travel across the globe almost
instantaneously.27 
Access to the Internet is currently available through a myriad of devices 
and electronic hardware, including desktop computers, laptops, mobile 
phones, and various other handheld devices.  With each new device comes
 19. Internet Usage Statistics the Internet Big Picture, INTERNET WORLD STATS, 
available at http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last updated Feb. 14, 2011). 
20. Id.
21. Id.
 22. See infra notes 23–27 and accompanying text. 
23. Battle of the Nile was a major naval battle fought between British and French
fleets during the Napoleanic Wars.  This battle in Aboukir Bay, Egypt marked one of the 
greatest British victories of Admiral Horatio Nelson, in defeating French Revolutionary
general Napoleon Bonaparte. See Battle of the Nile, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/415322/Battle-of-the-Nile (last accessed
Nov. 15, 2010).
24. GREGORY CLARK, A FAREWELL TO ALMS, Table 15.3: 1798–1914, Speed of
Information Travel to London: chart (2007), available at http://beebo.org/lately/2009-07-
12_speed-of-information-travel.html. 
25. Id.
26. Id.; Jason Kottke, The Speed of Information Travel, 1798–2009, KOTTKE (Sept.
2009), http://kottke.org/09/09/the-speed-of-information-travel-1798–2009. 
27. While the Internet is the newest medium for the flow of information, it is the 
fastest growing communication medium of all time.  It is therefore, unsurprisingly, the
first resort for information access for many of its users. See Peter Lyman & Hal R.
Varian, How Much Information? (2003), http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/how-much-info-
2003/execsum.htm. 
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an easier and more convenient method of accessing the Internet.  Two 
thirds of the world’s population currently has access to mobile phone 
technology, making it the fastest spreading technology in human history.28 
This statistic, coupled with predictions by leading information technology 
analysts that “mobile phones will overtake PCs as the most common web
access device” by the year 2013, emphasizes the astonishing implications of
modern technology.29 
The Internet provides anyone with access the ability to publish content
online with little or no oversight.30  To emphasize the extent of the
publication capability facilitated by the Internet, consider this: “[e]very 
minute, 20 hours of video is uploaded to YouTube.”31  Furthermore, the
Internet greatly enables, if not encourages, its contributors to participate 
anonymously.32  The danger posed by this new era of information
technology spread is that all information, good and bad, helpful and
harmful, has the potential to spread virally.33  With increased speed, 
accessibility, and participation comes a greater risk of uncontrollable 
information spread, and a more complicated task for governments seeking 
to restrict access to illegal, harmful, or otherwise inappropriate content.34 
Perhaps it is time for democratic citizens to recognize Internet filtration as
a viable method for ensuring that the activities and materials easily
recognizable as illegal by offline laws are capable of being similarly
identified and punished in the far more complicated online realm.
B. The Unique Challenge of Censorship in a Democracy 
Notwithstanding the disparate objectives of authoritarian and democratic 
nations in constructing policies to respond to the threat posed by the 
prevalence of the Internet, democratic nations face a more complex
challenge in developing and implementing policies to respond to this 
28. Boorstin, supra note 7.
 29. Brian Gammage, Gartner Top Predictions for 2010 Coping with the New
Balance of Power, GARTNER WEBINAR, Slide 6 (2009), available at http://www.gartner.
com/it/content/1260200/1260221/january_14_top_predictions_2010bgammage.pdf. 
30. Note that this paragraph is intended to emphasize the ease of publication on the 
Internet generally. The ability to publish freely or anonymously is restricted under
certain authoritarian regimes.  China, for example, has banned anonymous cell phone 
purchases. See Brian Barrett, China Bans Anonymous Cell Phone Purchases, GIZMODO
(Sept. 9, 2010, 8:40 PM), http://gizmodo.com/5634304/china-bans-anonymous-cellphone-
purchases.
31. Boorstin, supra note 7.
 32. Kenny Silverman, Defamation on the Internet, 601 PLI/PAT 327, 333 (2000). 




KEEN (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2012 1:51 PM     
  









   
 













   
  
     
 
 
    
 
  
   
 
   
 
[VOL. 13:  351, 2011] Untangling the Web
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
threat.35  The censorship measures taken by non-democratic nations in 
response to information deemed harmful on the Internet are not capable 
of being closely monitored through similar measures taken by democratic
nations.36 
The Chinese government, for example, has reserved for itself the right
to silence dissenters, such that the consequences of taking steps to
prevent the spread of unfavorable information on the Internet are minimal 
within its borders.37  In addition, authoritarian leaders are not politically
accountable to their populations in the manner that democratic governments
are.38 Repressive censorship policies are largely criticized outside of
these nations,39 but the lack of transparency,40 and continued cooperation
from mega corporations,41 have placed efforts by democratic nations to 
discourage repressive censorship at a standstill. 
Democratic nations have more difficulty dealing with new threats
posed by the Internet because the tenets of democracy and the freedom
of expression prohibit governments from making unilateral decisions to 
restrict speech and other inherent freedoms.42  In addition, democratic 
governments can be openly criticized because criticism and political 
dissent are essential to the functionality of a democracy.43  These factors,
combined with the accountability of the government to its citizens, have
35. Derek E. Bambauer, Cybersieves, 59 DUKE L.J. 377, 384 (2009). 
36. Id. at 401. 
37. See Michael Sainsbury, China Cracks Down on Dissenters, THE AUSTRALIAN
(May 11, 2010), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/china-cracks-down-on-
dissenters/story-e6frg6so-1225864742031; see also Peter Beaumont, Why is China So
Terrified of Dissent?, GUARDIAN NEWS & MEDIA LTD. (Jan. 17, 2010), http://www. 
guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jan/17/china-terrified-dissent-dissident-chinese; see also Ben
Doherty, Silence of the Dissenters: How South-East Asia Keeps Web Users in Line, 
GUARDIAN NEWS & MEDIA LTD. (Oct. 21, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/
2010/oct/21/internet-web-censorship-asia?intcmp=239. 
38. Bambauer, supra note 35 at 406-07. 
39. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2008 SPECIAL 301 REP. 7, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/asset_upload_file553_14869.pdf (criticizing the
Chinese search engine Baidu).
40. Nart Villeneuve, Search Monitor Project: Toward a Measure of Transparency
1, 7 (Citizen Lab, Occasional Paper No. 1, 2008), http://citizenlab.org/wp-content/uploads/
2011/08/nartv-searchmonitor.pdf.  
41. See Stuart Biggs, Under Oath and Under Pressure, S. CHINA MORNING POST, 
Feb. 21, 2006, at 1. 
42. Some corporations have continued to comply with censorship policies in 
pursuit of business incentives.  See Bambauer, supra note 35 at 403. 
43. In fact, democratic leaders such as President Barack Obama encourage criticism
and accountability. See infra note 193 and accompanying text. 
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posed great challenges for democratic nations in their attempts to
respond to the unparalleled level of access to information and material
facilitated by the Internet.44 
III. INTERNET CENSORSHIP IN AUSTRALIA
The current Internet censorship regime in Australia is encompassed by 
the Broadcasting Services Amendment Act of 1999 (BSA).45  The BSA
is a complaint-based system requiring domestic servers hosting
objectionable content to remove the material upon receipt of a takedown 
notice distributed by the Australian Communications and Media Authority
(ACMA).46 The ACMA is the government regulatory agency responsible
for evaluating and responding to complaints filed by Australian Internet
users.47  While participation from citizens is a useful and efficient means 
of locating and removing inappropriate content, the ACMA is also entitled 
to initiate investigations independently.48 
In order for the ACMA to deem content objectionable to the extent 
that it requires removal, it must qualify as “prohibited” based on the
classification system developed by the Australian government.49  The  
scope of “potentially prohibited” content has expanded over the years,
but today may cover material from the following categories: RC (refused
classification), X18 (non-violent, sexually explicit activity between
consenting adults), R18 (likely to disturb or harm minors), and, in some 
instances, MA15+ (restricted audiences).50  These categories were created
by the government’s “Classification Board,” which has crafted national 
guidelines for the classification of various forms of media.51
 44. Bambauer, supra note 35. 
45. Broadcasting Services Amendment (Online Services) Act 1999, No. 90 (amending 
Broadcasting Services Act, No. 110, 1992) (Austl.). 
46. See Broadcasting Services Act 1992, No. 110, §§ 147, 149 (1992) (Austl.); 
ACMA, Prohibited Online Content, ACMA, Prohibited Online Content, http://www.
comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2011C00390; EFA, infra note 54. 
47. EFA, supra note 14. 
48. See generally Online Regulation, ACMA, http://www.acma.gov.au/WEB/
STANDARD/pc=PC_90169 (last updated Aug. 13, 2010). 
49. ACMA, Prohibited Online Content, http:// www.acma.gov.au/WEB/STANDARD/
pc=PC_90102 (last updated July 26, 2011); see NATIONAL CLASSIFICATION CODE, FED.
REG. OF LEGIS. INSTRUMENTS F2005L00816 (Austl.), available at http://www.comlaw.
gov.au/Details/F2005L00816.
50. Australia’s Internet Censorship System, LIBERTUS.NET, (Apr. 11, 2010), http://
libertus.net/censor/netcensor.html#sc2008; see Broadcasting Services Act, No. 110, 
§§ 147, 149 (1992) (Austl.); see also id.
 51. Derek Bambauer, Filtering in Oz: Australia’s Foray into Internet Censorship, 
31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 493, 502–03 (2009). 
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The ACMA employs a different approach against domestically hosted
content.52  Material hosted within Australia’s borders is forwarded by the
ACMA to the Classification Board,53 which reviews the material and 
makes a final determination.54  If the content is ultimately deemed 
“prohibited,” a takedown notice is sent by the ACMA to the ISP (or 
content host) who is then responsible for removing the content.  When 
material that is not hosted in Australia is classified by the ACMA as
“prohibited,” the Agency does not forward it to the Classification Board, 
but rather makes a prediction as to the Board’s classification and 
responds accordingly—either permitting the content to remain or notifying 
“blocking software vendors to add the site to their block lists.”55 
Through a combination of complaints, investigations, and classifications, 
this system has been utilized to generate the blacklist of sites compiled
by the ACMA.56 
Current Australian Censorship policies have not been implemented in 
a manner that legally requires ISPs to block access to overseas content; 
however, they are required to remove objectionable content hosted
within their borders.57  Australian citizens are largely familiar with the
current policy, and some were even tolerant58 while under the impression 
that this policy was narrowly targeted to combat websites “relating to 
child sexual abuse, rape, incest, bestiality, sexual violence and detailed 
52. Id. at 502. 
53. Id. at 503–04. 
54. Internet Censorship: Internet Censorship Laws in Australia, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIERS AUSTRALIA, http://www.efa.org.au/Issues/Censor/cens1.html (last updated
Mar. 28, 2002). 
55. Regulating Online Content, ACMA, http://www.acma.gov.au/WEB/STANDARD/
pc=INT_IND_CONTENT_ABOUT (last visited Feb. 17, 2011). 
56. Bambauer, supra note 51 at 505. 
57. EFA, supra note 54. 
58. Louisa Hearn, Study casts doubt over net filter support, THE SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD (May 12, 2010), available at http://www.smh.com.au/technology/technology-
news/study-casts-doubt-over-net-filter-support-20100512-uvo0.html (discussing how
various studies indicated support for internet censorship in the interest of protecting
children, but when details of the mandatory filter and possible alternatives were
explained, enthusiasm dropped); Australia to implement mandatory internet censorship, 
HERALD SUN (Oct. 29, 2008), http://www.heraldsun.com.au/mandatory-censorship-on-
web/story-fna7dq6e-1111117883306 (quoting EFA board member Colin Jacobs, “If the 
Government would actually come out and say we’re only targeting child pornography it
would be a different debate.”). 
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instruction in crime”; however, disapproval and strong opposition emerged
following two contentious incidents surrounding censorship in Australia.59 
The onset of opposition from the Australian populace was marked by
perhaps the most controversial censorship proposal by a democratic
government to date.60  In 2009, the Australian Labor Party proposed a 
censorship policy that would legally mandate ISPs to filter and block
overseas websites falling into the “refused classification” category.61 
Australian ISPs would be required by law to abide by the aforementioned 
classification system,62 refusing access to all users based on this
categorization, or face legal repercussions and substantial fines.63 
Despite the Australian citizenry being familiar with the tools previously
employed by the government to enforce blocking—the ACMA and the
black list—this sudden forceful opposition has come as a result of the 
potentially freedom restricting proposal to mandate these allegedly
overbroad blockings by law.64  Because this list would continue to be
formulated without any transparency, Australian citizens have finally
become truly concerned about the potential consequences.65  This would
 59. Rich Bowden, Whistleblower Site Publishes Internet Blacklist, THE TECH
HERALD (Mar. 19, 2009), http://www.thetechherald.com/article.php/200912/3245/
Whistleblower-site-publishes-Internet-blacklist (quote by Australian Senator Steven 
Conroy about content of existing ACMA blacklist).
60. EFA, supra note 54. 
61. Internet Service Provider (ISP) filtering frequently asked questions, DEP’T OF 
BROADBAND COMMC’NS & THE DIGITAL ECON. (DBCDE), (last updated Oct. 11, 2011),
http://www.dbcde.gov.au/funding_and_programs/cyber safety_plan/internet_service_provider
_isp_filtering/isp_filtering_live_pilot/isp_filtering–frequently_asked_questions#11.0. 
62. EFA, supra note 14. 
63. ISP filtering frequently asked questions, supra note 61. 
64. Ari Sharp, Opposition grows to internet filter, THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD
(Feb. 25, 2010), http://www.smh.com.au/technology/technology-news/opposition-grows-
to-internet-filter-20100224-p3ma.html#ixzz1d57HNfHJ (“MP [members of parliament] 
on both sides of politics opposed to the government’s internet filtering proposal are 
vigorously lobbying their colleagues”); Iarla Flynn, Our submission on mandatory ISP 
level filtering, OFFICIAL GOOGLE AUSTRALIA BLOG (Feb. 14, 2010), http://google-au.blogspot. 
com/2010/02/our-submission-on-mandatory-isp-level.html (“There has been a lot of
attention around the Australian Government’s mandatory ISP level filtering proposal. 
Google--and many of you--have argued that the proposal goes too far, with a broad-
scoped filter, and a regime which takes the focus off more important areas such as online 
safety education and better support for policing efforts.”); Media Release, Joint 
Statement on Internet Censorship, SAVE THE CHILDREN AUSTRALIA (July 2009), 
http://www.savethechildren.org.au/images/documents/Joint_Statement_on_Internet_Cen
sorship.pdf (“No other Western democracy has mandatory ISP-level internet filtering.
Australians should not have to sacrifice their freedoms to make Australia a world-leader
in ineffective Internet censorship.” (emphasis added)). 
65. See Australian Internet Censorship Filter Delayed, UNITE THE COWS: DIGITAL 
MEDIA RESOURCE (July 13, 2010), http://www.unitethecows.com/content/245-australian-
internet-censorship-filter-delayed.html (“After drawing a multitude of complaints from 
citizens concerned that the system would sensor far more than child pornography, 
Australian officials have decided to take the next year to refine the system.”).
360
KEEN (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2012 1:51 PM     
  




















   
  
  
    
  
  
[VOL. 13:  351, 2011] Untangling the Web
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
prevent Australians from having any legal means with which to access
certain objectionable content hosted overseas, including some information 
that they may be legally entitled to view.66 
A global censorship comparison report compiled by the Electronic 
Frontiers Australian (EFA) asserts “the lack of similar laws in comparable 
countries is not due to a failure of [other] Parliaments or Governments to
consider the problems of illegal content unsuitable for minors on the 
Internet. Rather, it reflects a different approach from that of Australia to
dealing with the problems.”67  “Australia’s decision to impose mandatory
Internet censorship through technology [filtering] . . . puts the country at 
the forefront of the spread of this practice from authoritarian regimes 
such as China and Iran to Western democratic nations.”68 
Some authorities respond to these accusations by contending that there 
can be no “legitimacy” argument against a government taking actions it
is legally entitled to take.69  Australia does not have a Constitutional
equivalent to the First Amendment, and therefore does not recognize the 
same freedom of expression that serves as broad protection to the United
States citizenry against similar policies.70 
Despite rationalizations citing the atypical nature of Australia’s 
democratic composition, the uneasy response from ISPs demonstrates 
that Australia is entering into a controversial and potentially illegitimate 
realm of online censorship.71  In response to the various stages of proposed 
legislation, ISPs confronted Australian Parliament with numerous concerns. 
Google, a mega corporation that previously found itself at the forefront 
of a censorship controversy with China, voiced certain concerns to
Australian Parliament about the proposal.72  Google submitted a report in 
which it stated: 
66. Charles Arthur, Google and Yahoo Criticise Australia’s ‘Heavy-Handed’
Internet Filter Plans, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 29, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/
2010/mar/29/google-yahoo-australia-internet-filter. 
67. EFA, supra note 14. 
68. Karina Travaglione, Internet Censorship in Australia—A ‘Clean-Feed’?, (July
2009), http://www.mannkal.org/downloads/scholars/internet-censorship-in-australia.pdf; 
see also Bambauer, supra note 51, at 494. 
69. See generally  MICHAEL CHESTERMAN, FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AUSTRALIAN
LAW: A DELICATE PLANT 75 (2000). 





























   
 
 









some limits, like child pornography, are obvious.  No Australian wants that to
be available and we agree . . . [b]ut moving to a mandatory ISP-level filtering
regime with a scope that goes well beyond such material is heavy-handed and
can raise genuine questions about restrictions on access to information.73 
An already hostile Australian society was further fueled in their
opposition to recent censorship proposals74 when whistleblower website
Wikileaks published an alarming list purported to be the current 
Australian blacklist.75  The alleged list revealed that roughly 2,300 URLs
were contained on the blacklist, and that despite repeated assurances by
authorities that the list contained only material directly linked to “child 
sexual abuse, rape, incest, bestiality, sexual violence and detailed
instruction in crime,” nearly two thirds of the blacklist was comprised of 
URLs and material that adults have a legal right to both access and
76possess.
Following the controversial leak, the Australian Broadcasting
Corporation reported that “[a]s well as child pornography, the list . . . 
also includes online gambling sites, YouTube links, regular porn and 
fetish sites, and websites of a tour operator, Queensland boarding kennel 
and a Queensland dentist.”77  Although Australian Parliament and the
ACMA have vehemently denied the authenticity of the leaked list,78 they
73. Id.
74. A discussion among Australian internet users on HACKER NEWS (thread
available at http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=522706) following the leak of the 
blacklist included the following comment: “We’re hoping the leaking of the list comes as 
a real blow to the government’s ‘clean feed’ censorship plans. . . .  All this censorship 
nonsense really makes me ashamed to be Australian.”  Another commenter responded, 
“After you spend a few more hours being ashamed, get MAD!!!  . . .  This AU firewall-
in-progress is a serious battleground for freedom of speech of all developed nations.”);
see also Dan Walmsley, It’s time to get angry about Australian Internet censorship
(Aug. 17, 2009), http://www.danwalmsley.com/2009/08/27/its-time-to-get-angry-about-
australian-internet-censorship/.
75. Oliver Luft, Wikileaks Taken Offline After Publishing Australia’s Banned Websites, 
GUARDIAN NEWS & MEDIA LTD. (Mar. 19 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/pda/
2009/mar/19/wikileaks-banned-australian-websites. 
76. Bowden, supra note 59; Nicolas Suzor et al., Submission to the Department of 
Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy ‘Mandatory internet service provider
(ISP) filtering: Measures to increase accountability and transparency for Refused
Classification material ‘ consultation, ELECTRONIC FRONTIERS AUSTRALIA, 5 n.10 (Feb. 
2010) http://nic.suzor.net/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/2010-EFA-DBCDE-Transparency.pdf
(“As at September 2009, it is clear that only one-third of material that is Refused
Classification on the ACMA Blacklist was child sexual abuse material; two-thirds of RC
material on the ACMA blacklist is legal to view and possess in Australia.”).
77. Nic MacBean, Internet Filter Blacklist Leaked on Web, ABC NEWS (Mar. 19,
2009), http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/03/19/2520591.htm. 
78. Suzanne Tindal, Leaked List Not ACMA Blacklist: Conroy, ZDNET (Mar. 19,
2009), available at http://www.zdnet.com.au/leaked-list-not-acma-blacklist-conroy-
339295547.htm. 
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responded by referring to the controversial leak as “grossly irresponsible” 
and then proceeded to add the Wikileaks website to their blacklist.79 
IV. INTERNET CENSORSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”80 
This protection of free expression extends to speech in print and online
formats.81  American critics of foreign democracies’ censorship policies 
often overlook this significant disparity between free speech rights of
these nations and the United States.  Australia, as previously discussed,
does not have an express guarantee to the freedom of expression or any
equivalent provision to the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.82 
It is this venerable guarantee from the founding fathers and creators of
the U.S Constitution that has shielded U.S. citizens from encountering 
any unwarranted restraints on free speech or expression, including any 
overreaching equivalent in the cyber realm.83  The government made two
notable attempts to enact Federal laws with the objective of censoring
certain categories of online content.  However, neither one of these laws
are currently in force.84  In addition, several states within the U.S. have
attempted to pass censorship laws, which were also struck down on
Constitutional grounds shortly after their conception.85 
In 1996 the U.S. implemented the Communications Decency Act
(CDA),86 marking the government’s first attempt to restrict material 
deemed inappropriate on the Internet.  The CDA was a statute making it 
a federal crime to transmit material that, “under contemporary community 
standards, would be deemed patently offensive to minors.”87 
In the months following its enactment, portions of the CDA were 
restrained, until it was ultimately struck down by the Supreme Court in 
79. Id.
 80. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
81. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) [hereinafter Reno II]. 
82. Arthur, supra note 66. 
83. See Aaron D. White, Crossing the Electronic Border: Free Speech Protection
for the International Internet, 58 DEPAUL. L. REV. 491, 507 (2009). 
84. The unsuccessful attempts to implement these laws (the CDA and COPA) are
discussed below.
85. Id.
86. Communications Decency Act (CDA) of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 223. 
87. ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 166 (3d Cir. 2000) [hereinafter Reno I]. 
 363





















     
  













the landmark case Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union.88  The Court
held that “the CDA lacks the precision that the First Amendment requires
when a statute regulates the content of speech,” thereby confirming that the
Internet is entitled to the same level of First Amendment protections, and 
therefore the same level scrutiny in its restrictions as offline media.89 
The Court unanimously voted to strike down the anti-indecency provisions
of the CDA as an “unnecessarily broad suppression” that effectively
prevented adults from engaging in indecent speech, which has traditionally 
received significant First Amendment protection.90 
The Court held that in order to prevent minors from accessing this
potentially harmful material, the CDA “suppresses a large amount of 
speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to
one another.”91  Furthermore, while protecting minors is certainly a
compelling interest, the Court held that to place the burden of that
protection on adult speech “is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives
would be at least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the 
statute was enacted to serve.”92 
The significance of Reno v. ACLU is twofold.93  First, it provides the 
initial assurance that the First Amendment protects speech and expression 
in its various formats, including speech that occurs over the Internet.94 
Second, it provides a general confirmation that the U.S. will continue to
treat potential legal disputes and other criminal activity conducted on the
Internet by applying the same legal standards and Constitutional guarantees 
as those afforded to persons and activities conducted offline.95 
The next notable attempt by the American government to enact a
proposal intended to censor objectionable content on the Internet was the 
adoption of the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) in October 1998.96 
COPA, similar to the CDA, was intended to ensure that children could
not access “material harmful to minors” on the Internet.97  This Act 
ensured compliance by legally requiring commercial websites to restrict
access to their content by minors, but provided an affirmative defense to
publishers that made attempts to restrict access through age verification 
88. Reno II, 521 U.S. at 844. 
89. Id. at 846. 
90. Id. at 875. 
91. Id. at 846. 
92. Id. at 874. 
93. Reno I, 217 F.3d at 166. 
94. Corn-Revere, Robert, The First Amendment and the electronic media, FIRST 
AMENDMENT CTR, available at http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org//speech/internet/ 
overview.aspx.
95. Id.
96. Child Online Protection Act (COPA) of 1998, 47 U.S.C. § 231. 
97. Reno II, 521 U.S. at 871. 
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and credit card requirements.98  Upholding an initial temporary injunction 
by a Pennsylvania District Court, the Court of Appeals correctly predicted 
“due to technological limitations, COPA—Congress’ laudatory attempt 
to achieve its compelling objective of protecting minors from
harmful material on the World Wide Web—is more likely than not to be
found unconstitutional as overbroad on the merits.”99 
Advocates of filtering the web allege that the problem with the U.S.’s
approach to censorship, as demonstrated in these two cases, is within the 
guarantees of the Constitution and those who maintain “radical” views 
on the protection it affords.100  They contend that the groups fighting to
preserve these freedoms are simultaneously blocking the implementation 
of policies that are only intended to protect children and aid in the 
censorship that is necessary to effectively do so.101  Alternatively, opponents
contend that if certain Constitutional “exceptions” are permitted to serve
as a safeguard to vulnerable groups, while there are other less restrictive 
means available, the door is then open for further intrusions by the 
government.102 
These two holdings “breathed new life into disputes about what kind 
of speech may be excluded from First Amendment protection” and their 
“connection to this new medium confirms that technological change will
continue to fuel debates over the meaning and scope of the First
Amendment.”103 
V. INTERNET CENSORSHIP IN THE U.K. 
In 1996, the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF)104 was formed in the  
United Kingdom in response to police investigations that revealed ISPs
were inadvertently carrying indecent newsgroup content containing obscene
images to the public.105 The objectionable images hosted by ISPs included
those depicting the sexual abuse of children, which were in direct violation
98. Id. at 860–61. 
99. Reno I, 217 F.3d at 181. 
100. Donna Rice Hughes, Filters Don’t Censor, They Protect Our Kids: Foes of 
Internet filter law don’t understand the dangers of online porn, PROTECTKIDS.COM (Mar.
27, 2001), http://www.protectkids.com/donnaricehughes/article_filtersdontcensor.htm. 
101. Id.
102. Reno II, 521 U.S. at 879. 
103. Corn-Revere, supra note 94. 
104. IWF History, INTERNET WATCH FOUND., http://www.iwf.org.uk/about-iwf/ iwf-
history [hereinafter IWF] (last visited Sept. 2, 2011). 
105. Id.
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of the Protection of Children Act of 1978.106  The IWF was formed with 
the purpose of reviewing and responding to reports from U.K. citizens
of potentially illegal content discovered on the Internet.  The organization 
was established “to fulfil [sic] an independent role in receiving, assessing 
and tracing public complaints about child sexual abuse content on the 
internet and to support the development of website rating systems.”107 
Unlike the ACMA, created to facilitate the censorship of objectionable 
online content in Australia,108 the IWF does not initiate independent
investigations, but rather assesses potentially objectionable content only
in response to reports made by the public.109  The IWF is a non-
governmental, charitable body that reviews these citizen reports and
formulates a “black list” comprised of all the websites that host unsuitable
information that is, or is believed to be, in contravention to U.K. laws.110 
It is the offline laws in the U.K. that govern what is suitable online; there
is no separate classification or standard for what is considered
inappropriate or illegal in the online realm.111 
U.K. censorship policies focus primarily on combating the spread of 
obscene material that depicts the sexual abuse of children.112  Although 
the blocked list compiled by the IWF is not publically available, the 
organization maintains that “[e]very URL on the list depicts indecent
images of children, advertisements for or links to such content.”113 The 
nature of the material in question is assessed in accordance with U.K.
law, and if ultimately added to the block list, is done so on the belief that
it is criminal.114 The criminality of this material is embodied in the
Sexual Offenses Act of 2003, which contains criteria established by the 
U.K. Sentencing Guidelines Council.115  These guidelines are comprised 
of assessment levels that are applied to determine the sexually offensive
and criminal nature of both offline and online material in the U.K.116
 106. EFA, supra note 14. 
107. IWF, supra note 104. 
108. EFA, supra note 54. 
109. RONALD DEIBERT ET AL., ACCESS DENIED: THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF
GLOBAL INTERNET FILTERING 188 (MIT Press 2008). 
110. Weixiao Wei, Online Child Sexual Abuse Content: The Development of a




111. Remit, Vision and Mission, INTERNET WATCH FOUND., http://www.iwf.org. 
uk/about-iwf/remit-vision-and-mission (last visited Sept. 2, 2011). 
112. IWF Facilitation of the Blocking Initiative, INTERNET WATCH FOUND., http://www.
iwf.org.uk/services/blocking (last visited Sept. 4, 2011). 
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Sexual Offenses Act (SOA), (2003) §§ 1–79, 12(3) HALS. STAT. (4th ed.) 746.
116. Wei, supra note 110. 
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While the IWF plays a crucial role in facilitating Internet censorship in 
the U.K., the organization asserts that their role is “restricted to the
compilation and provision list: the blocking solution is entirely a matter 
for the company deploying the list.”117  The black list, updated twice daily 
by the IWF, is transferred to ISPs which are then encouraged to abide by 
the restriction of the sites contained therein.  If an ISP chooses not to 
follow the IWF’s recommendations, it risks ineligibility to contract with
the government and other adhering public bodies.118  Exploring the
mechanisms employed by the U.K. government in order to ensure
compliance by ISPs in these filtering efforts, the U.K.’s Times Newspaper
explains: 
The ban on public bodies signing contracts with companies that do not actively
block paedophile sites was announced by the Office of Government Commerce. 
In an instruction to all departments, agencies and quangos, it said that they
should deal only with contractors who agreed to block a list of sites known to
carry abusive images.  The list, containing between 500 and 800 websites, is
maintained by the Internet Watch Foundation and updated twice daily.
An “action note” issued to all departments said the new policy applied to
contracts with internet firms, mobile operators, search providers and filtering
companies. The note said: “The Government should lead by example and
require its suppliers of internet services to deploy the list across services they
provide to Government.”119 
Despite the obvious business incentives for domestic ISPs to abide by
the filtering regulations distributed by the IWF, to date, there is no
legally mandated censorship law in effect in the U.K.120  Aside from this
“informal pressure” placed on ISPs to abide,121 servers are free to open 
search results to the materials blacklisted by the IWF.  However, reports 
show that approximately 98% of all Internet users in the U.K. are blocked 
from access to the materials placed on the black lists.122  This is an  
indication that most, if not all, ISPs have chosen to comply. 
117. IWF, supra note 104. 
118. Id.
 119. Sean O’Neill, Government Ban on Internet Firms That Do Not Block Child Sex 
Sites, TIMES ONLINE (Mar. 2010), http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/tech_ 
and_web/the_web/article7055882.ece. 
120. EFA, supra note 14. 
121. Travaglione, supra note 68. 
122. Wei, supra note 110. 
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In December 2000, the U.K. government published the “Communications 
White Paper”123 which addressed the “new communications environment”
and the regulation approaches that would soon be implemented in
response.124  While many feared that this would mark the beginning of a
new Internet in the U.K., the White Paper ultimately indicated that 
regulation of the Internet would be left outside the scope of this new
legislation.125  The government’s response to Internet regulation was
addressed in chapter 6.10.1, stating:
The Government sees enormous benefits in promoting new media, especially
the Internet.  But it is important that there are effective ways of tackling illegal
material on the Internet and that users are aware of the tools available, such as
rating and filtering systems, that help them control what they and their children
will see on the Internet.  Research suggests that this is what people want in
relation to the Internet, rather than third party regulation.126 
This publication, and the subsequent adoption of the Communications 
Act of 2003 made it clear that the government had no discernable intent
to enact Internet censorship via legislation.127 
The U.K.’s current censorship policy, unlike the policies proposed in
Australia and those discarded in the U.S., does not involve legislation
specific to the Internet.128  Its approach to the regulation of Internet content
involves allowing Internet users “to regulate their own internet experience” 
by offering tools to assist citizens in controlling the content that they see,
rather than giving this power to a third party or requiring compliance by 
law.129 
The U.K. government has, however, taken an active role in the
construction of this rating and filtering system, as well as in the operation
of the IWF.130 It has also informed the public that it supports, and will
continue to encourage the work of the IWF by encouraging compliance
with these efforts where available.131  This policy has been effective,
although at times slow, with only minimal opposition by citizens of
the U.K.132
 123. COMMUNICATIONS WHITE PAPER, A New Future For Communications (2003),
available at http://www.antelope.org.uk/publications/regulation%20and%20internet%
20commsbill.pdf.
124. The regulation approaches implemented are embodied in the Communications 
Acts of 2003. See COMMUNICATIONS ACT, 2003, c. 21 (Eng), available at http://www.
legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/21/pdfs/ukpga_20030021_en.pdf. 
125. Id.
 126. COMMUNICATIONS WHITE PAPER, supra note 123, at 13. 
127. COMMUNICATIONS ACT, supra note 124. 
128. EFA, supra note 14. 
129. Id.
 130. IWF, supra note 104. 
131. EFA, supra note 14, at 16. 
132. Id.
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These policies have been successful because these methods enable the 
public to play an active role in determining which content is (at least
initially) unsuitable for viewing by their own standards of reasonableness.133 
Although the IWF ultimately makes a determination as to the legality of 
this content, it does so in accordance with the UK’s offline laws. These
determinations by the IWF serve more as an additional safeguard than a 
unilateral determination, because citizens are at least guaranteed that the 
determinations are made in accordance with offline laws.134 
VI. RULING OUT GLOBAL CENSORSHIP
Some theorists suggest that an international approach to Internet
censorship is the key to a legitimate and effective regulation policy.135 
They argue that reciprocal participation by governments and their
respective ISPs is necessary in order to ensure that wholly objectionable
and illegal content is effectively removed from within the borders of the 
nation in which it is hosted.136  They believe that only this approach will
be entirely effective, because only the nation in which this content is
hosted has the legal authority to effectuate its removal.137 
Although in theory this is an attractive option, in execution, it is not a 
feasible one. Not only do standards of decency vary significantly across
borders, but also the objectives of various governments in implementing
these censorship policies are vastly dissimilar.138  Defining indecency on 
a global scale is a task that would pose vast, if not insurmountable
133. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (explaining that the government 
will to continue to allow citizens to “control what they and their children will see on the 
Internet” through rating and filtering based on their own standards). 
134. The U.K. does not have laws specialized to the online realm; therefore, all 
determinations must be made in accordance with offline laws.  Id.  (“The United Kingdom 
has not enacted censorship legislation specific to the Internet and appears to have no 
intention of so doing.”). 
135. Elaine M. Chen, Global Internet Freedom: Can Censorship and Freedom
Coexist?, 13 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 229, 232 (2003).  (“Internet
censorship and jamming protocol should be left to an international arena, such as the 
United Nations, where a more ‘neutral’ Internet resolution can be enforced.”).
136. ACCESS CONTROLLED: THE SHAPING OF POWER, RIGHTS, AND RULE IN CYBERSPACE
64 (Ronald J. Deibert et al. eds., 2010). 
137. Id.
 138. Bambauer, supra note 35, at 384. 
 369





    
 
 






   
  





       
 
 
     
 




   
 
   
 
difficulties.  It only takes brief examination of the current decency standards 
and government objectives in order to recognize the deficiency.139 
Standards of decency in democracies structured akin to the U.S. would 
require a narrowly tailored definition to pass Constitutional muster, which
would fail to translate across borders to nations that are not similarly
composed.  Italy, for example, does not criminalize zoophilia,140 BDSM,141 
or fetishism,142 whereas these acts in certain forms are strictly prohibited in
the U.S.143 Australia,144 and illegal under specialized regulation in the
U.K.145  Germany censors material containing holocaust denials; China
actively censors political dissent, and Brazil and Canada censor broad 
categories of racial hate speech.146  Furthermore, Australian proposals
appear to be aimed at ultimately censoring indecent or “unsuitable”
material including graphic pornography, racial hate speech, and extreme
violence—much of which is legal to view and possess by adults in most
other democratic nations, and is protected by the U.S. Constitution.147 
Even if it were feasible to construct a definition or standard of
indecency that encompassed, without restricting, global interpretations 
of what should be absolutely eliminated from the cyber realm, this 
global policy would prove futile for nations seeking stricter levels of
censorship. These nations would waste time and resources by participating 
in a global censorship scheme, as they would ultimately still need to 
implement their own policies in order to accomplish their more rigorous
objectives. Consequently, many nations would have little incentive to 
139. Green, infra note 146 (“Censorship is international, continuous and pervasive, 
but it is not a seam-less monolith.  Concerns that seem paramount to one nation are 
meaningless to another.”). 
140. “Zoophilia” is an erotic fixation on animals that may result in sexual
excitement through real or fancied contact.  MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/medical/zoophilia. 
141. The term “BDSM” is an abbreviation derived from the terms bondage and
discipline, domination and submission, sadism and masochism.  WIKIPEDIA, http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/BDSM.
142. “Fetishism” is the displacement of sexual arousal or gratification onto a fetish 
(e.g., onto an alternate object or body part). DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.
com/browse/fetishism.
143.  Depiction of animal cruelty, 18 U.S.C. § 48, Pt. I, Ch. 3 (2000). 
144. HALSBURY’S LAWS OF AUSTRALIA, vol. 9, p. 247662 (Sydney: Butterworths, 
1999) (laws implemented by Province). 
145. Criminal Justice and Immigration Act, (2008) § 63, 12(4) HALS. STAT. (4th
ed.) 649.
146. Jonathon Green & Nicholas J. Karolides, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CENSORSHIP
72, 106, 224–36 (Facts on File. Inc., 2005); Const. of Brazil, 5 Oct. 1988, available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c4820bf2.html. 
147. AU Gov’t Mandatory ISP Filtering/Censorship Plan, LIBERTUS.NET (last
modified Aug. 4, 2011), http://libertus.net/censor/isp-blocking/au-govplan.html#s40;
([M]any of the sub-categories of “RC” involve material legal to sell/publish in other 
Western democratic countries.). 
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participate in a global system, particularly if the guidelines are tailored 
to fall within the scope of the U.S. Constitution.148 
VII. PROPOSAL: ACQUIRING PUBLIC APPROVAL THROUGH 
LEGITIMACY, TRANSPARENCY AND     
EFFECTIVENESS
In order for a censorship policy adopted by a democratic nation to be 
effective, public approval is imperative.  The organizations and populations
that structure these democratic nations have frequently demonstrated this
condition, and the dawn of new media has made it even easier for these 
groups to act on their frustrations to effectuate change.149  When  the  
public perceives the government becoming less accountable, and those 
capable, if not responsible, for preventing these infringements (media 
outlets, ISPs) becoming less independent from the government, they
have, and will continue, to take action and voice their concerns.150 
In order to acquire public approval, a censorship proposal must:        
(1) clearly articulate the objectives of the government; (2) reflect the stated 
objectives; (3) exhibit transparency in order to ensure that the policy reflects 
the stated objectives; (4) acquire legitimacy through a valid foundation 
in offline laws; and (5) be effective in accomplishing its intended purpose. 
A. Articulate the Objectives of the Government 
The first two requirements, that censorship policies clearly articulate
and ultimately reflect the stated objectives of the government, are grounded
in the Lockean notion that a democratic government is responsible for 
representing and serving the interests of the people by whom they were
elected.151  The government must therefore ensure that its ultimate goal
148. This Comment dismisses a global standard as the solution to accomplishing the 
objectives of democratic nations in censoring content to protect internet users
domestically; however, it is important to note that a global standard or scheme is a
significant (and perhaps essential) step in efforts to undermine heavy handed censorship
schemes internationally. The focus of this Comment is on constructing a workable 
filtration scheme within democratic nations, not on resolving global censorship issues.
Thus, democratic nations would have little incentive to participate in a global scheme
aimed at protecting the interests of their own citizens.
149. See infra notes 167–68. 
150. Id.
151. This idea is embodied in John Locke’s theory of government based on the 
consent of the governed. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 238 (The
Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2006) (1698). 
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in constructing any regulatory policy is to serve and protect the interests 
of the people.  It is important that the grounds for implementation of any
proposed regulation be clearly articulated to the public so that they are 
able to recognize that their own interests are the ultimate goal of the
government’s in crafting any policy to regulate Internet content.152 
B. Reflect the Stated Objectives
It is not enough, however, that the government articulate their
objectives in order to demonstrate its goal of serving the people.  The 
proposed policy must actually reflect the government’s stated objectives. 
The consequences of acting in contravention to stated objectives was
observed in Australia’s foray into Internet censorship.153 
As was previously discussed, Australian Parliament developed an 
Internet content categorization system,154 which it used as the basis for 
its censorship policy and black list, and informed the public that it only
intended to block sites that fell within the “RC category.”155  After repeated
assurances that the objective of the policy was the protection of minors, 
and that all of the material blocked contained prohibited child pornography
and abuse, a leak ultimately revealed that broader, protected categories 
of speech were being censored as well.156  Whether these incidental blocks
were deliberate or attributable to a combination of human and technological 
error, does not alter the detrimental effect that they had on the level of 
support for the censorship policy itself.157 
If the government states that its objective is the protection of minors, it 
should not regulate any content that falls outside the scope of this objective.
The failure to act in accordance with stated objectives creates political
distrust—democracy’s greatest adversary in attempting to accrue support 
for the implementation of unfamiliar and unfavorable policies.  Any
discernable contradiction between the stated objectives and the actions
of the government may not only result in an immense decrease in support 
152. For example, the protection of their children being the objective of implementing a 
policy to censor certain types of pornography. 
153. Luft, supra note 75. 
154. See supra notes 50, 51. 
155. Id.
 156. Suzor, supra note 76; Belinda Luscombe, A Blacklist for Websites Backfires in
Australia, TIME (Mar. 27, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599, 
1888011,00.html. 
157. Richard Phillips, Australian Photographer Bill Henson—scapegoat for a wider 
assault on democratic rights, WORLD SOCIALIST WEB SITE (May 30, 2008), http://www.
wsws.org/articles/2008/may2008/hens-m30.shtml. 
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for presently proposed regulation policies,158 but is also likely to impede 
confidence in future policies, despite potential legitimacy. 
C. Transparency 
In order to assure the public that proposals to censor content on the 
Internet veritably reflect stated governmental objectives, governments 
must offer a level of transparency in both their policies and the URLs
that are ultimately censored or placed on blacklists.159  This is perhaps
the most contentious matter in current legislative attempts to acquire 
support for censorship proposals. 
Both Australian and British citizens have petitioned for transparency 
in the lists compiled for regulation, but governments have been unwilling to
comply.160  Frank Fisher, a critic of the UK’s failure to offer transparency, 
expressed the complaint in this way: “[t]his is, remember, that same
government that’s constantly telling us, with regard to ID cards, that
if you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear.  Why then, do they
hide this list?”161 
In response to more pressing calls for transparency by an apprehensive 
Australian population, the Minister for Broadband, Communications and
the Digital Economy, Senator Stephen Conroy, issued a press release.
Conroy articulated Parliament’s (and the ACMA’s) reasoning for
repudiating a transparent policy stating, “the problem when you produce 
a list of URLs is you are actually giving the address of where to go and 
look.”162 Critics challenge this as an unfounded excuse, posing the
obvious argument that if the proposed filtering policy is going to be 
effective, these sites should not be accessible regardless of people
knowing where to look.163  So either “the filter will block websites
Australian’s aren’t meant to be accessing, in which case it really doesn’t
 158. Asher Moses, ‘Caching error’ caused Henson blacklisting, THE SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD (Mar. 27, 2009, 2:54 PM), http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2009/03/27/12376 
57133829.html. 
159. Id.
160. Media Release, National Broadband Network, Outcome of Consultations on 
Transparency and Accountability for ISP Filtering of RC Content, (July 9, 2010),
(available at http://www.minister.dbcde.gov.au/media/media_releases/2010/068). 
161. Fisher, supra note 18. 













    
   

























matter if the banned URL list is made public or not, or the filter won’t
work.”164  Furthermore, if the policy conforms to the stated objectives of
the government in primarily blocking child pornography, few people 
should feel compelled to circumvent the system in order to access the 
banned material, unless of course, they want to risk facing criminal
penalties.165 
If democratic governments continue to seek filtration via blacklists
that lack transparency, they are not only depriving citizens of the
participation they are entitled to, but are offering control to third party 
operators who have only implied accountability to the public. Without
transparency, the incentives, accuracy, and effectiveness of third party 
operators will remain cynical in the eyes of the public. Although a 
disinterested third party operator may be more reliable in performing this 
task than the government itself, without transparency, no organization
responsible for compiling the list will attain widespread legitimacy.  The 
adoption of a transparent policy would not only serve to generate 
support for regulation that current policies lack, but it would increase 
attention and oversight by these third party operators for fear of making 
a mistake.  In addition, transparency would enable public oversight that 
would quickly and appropriately help to identify and eliminate any 
errors overlooked by the operators.  Transparency would ensure that the
government has confidence in its system, and the people have confidence in
its methods.166 
Governments need to recognize—as ISPs refusing “heavy handed”
censorship have—that the Internet is a global “median that pays no attention
to borders, and . . . militates against control.”167  Where governments fail to
hear calls for transparent reform, other entities will, and they will respond 
accordingly through measures that offer the transparency sought by
164. Id.
165. For example, facing criminal penalties for contravening well-established offline
laws against possessing and distributing child pornography. See SOA, supra note 115. 
166. Some jurisdictions have already experimented with and adopted transparent 
censorship policies.  For example, in Saudi Arabia: 
[U]sers are presented with a blockpage which states that the requested Web 
site has been blocked but it also contains a link to a Web form through which
users can petition to have the site unblocked . . . .  The acknowledgement of
blocked content allows users to petition to have sites unblocked if there has
been a mis-classification.  It also requires governments to justify why a specific site
is blocked. 
Nart Villeneuve, The Filtering Matrix: Integrated Mechanisms of Information Control
and the Demarcation of Borders in Cyberspace, FIRST MONDAY (2006) 11(1), available 
at http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1307/1227. 
167. Boorstin, infra note 168; see also Rosa Golijan, Google Refuses to Continue
Censoring Results in China, GIZMODO (Jan. 12, 2010, 6:25 PM), http://gizmodo.com/
5446712/google-refuses-to-continue-censoring-results-in-china. 
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dissatisfied citizens.168  Nontransparent policies will ultimately result in 
cyber protests through hacks,169 leaks,170 and the assembly of organizations
such as Wikileaks,171 with the goal of bringing frustrations to the attention
of the general public. As articulated by Wikileaks on the organization’s 
webpage: 
Publishing improves transparency, and this transparency creates a better society 
for all people.  Better scrutiny leads to reduced corruption and stronger democracies 
in all society’s institutions, including government, corporations and other
organisations. A healthy, vibrant and inquisitive journalistic media plays a vital 
role in achieving these goals.  We are part of that media.172 
D. Legitimacy Through a Foundation in Offline Laws
If democratic nations want to implement policies that will not be met
with opposition by their respective populations, they also need to ensure 
the laws they implement online obtain legitimacy by reflecting the rights 
granted to their citizens offline.  Governments cannot and should not use 
the Internet as a means of covertly eliminating unfavorable content that 
is not regulated by offline laws.  Implementing an online censorship scheme 
that has no legal basis offline is not a policy that will endure in a Western 
democracy, and is not a policy that will or should gain support from the 
organizations and bodies involved in its implementation.
Inherent in the democratic freedom of speech is the right to converse 
without censorship or restraint. This freedom of expression empowers
168. Robert Boorstin, Google Director of Corporate and Policy Communications, 
Address at the Geneva Summit for Human Rights Tolerance and Democracy (Mar. 9, 
2010) (available at http://blog.unwatch.org/index.php/2010/04/29/google-internet-censorship-
getting-worse-more-sophisticated/) (excerpt from Boorstin’s speech). 
Just yesterday . . . the United States Treasury Department lifted what has been 
a long-time ban on allowing companies like ours to license certain kinds of
software . . . to countries like Iran and Sudan. [T]his is a great accomplishment.
We feel it’s something the companies and human rights groups argued for 
together. 
Id. 
169. Kathy Marks, “Operation ‘Titstorm” Hackers Declare Cyber War on Australia, 
THE INDEPENDENT (Feb. 11, 2010), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/australasia/
operation-titstorm-hackers-declare-cyber-war-on-australia-1895838.html (discussing action
taken by anonymous hackers following announcements regarding implementation of 
internet restrictions in Australia).
170. Luft, supra note 75. 
171. About Wikileaks, 1.3 Why the Media (and Particularly Wikileaks) is Important, 
WIKILEAKS, http://wikileaks.org/About.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2011). 
172. Id.
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members of democratic societies to communicate and access information
without censorship over the content of their ideas.  Despite this fundamental 
canon of democracy, the freedom of expression is not absolute.173 
Democratic administrations have traditionally recognized that the need to 
prevent certain illicit activities outweighs the need protect peoples’ right 
to encourage and engage in them.174 
E. Effective in Accomplishing Stated Objectives 
The final requirement for any form of Internet regulation to gain
support and favorable understanding in a western democracy is the 
policy effectively does what it is implemented to do.175  In addition, if an
equally effective policy could be implemented in a less restrictive
manner, the alternate mechanism should be fully explored prior to the 
implementation of a censorship scheme.176  Ensuring effectiveness can 
be accomplished by weighing the interests of regulating the appropriate
content versus swift implementation, and recognizing that speed should
be sacrificed for increased effectiveness.  Ultimately, ensuring that proper 
designations and removals are being made is more important than a swift
and strong solution, which would likely be accompanied by inaccuracies 
and subsequent corrections. 
For example, Australia’s ACMA blacklist contained contemporary art
photographer Bill Henson’s website, despite its mere PG classification.
Although there were other misclassifications,177 this was the only “PG” 
classification178 that earned itself a spot on the blacklist. Notably, this
was not Henson’s first confrontation with Australian authorities over the
notorious content of his work.179  When confronted about the blacklisting of
such innocuously rated180 material, Australian Senator Stephen Conroy
173. See generally When Can’t I Say That?, EDUCATION FOR FREEDOM, http:// 
www.freedomforum.org/packages/first/Curricula/EducationforFreedom/L04main.htm (last
visited Aug. 26, 2011). 
174. Commonly subject to limitations are things such as hate speech and the 
incitement of imminent lawless action. Id.; Brown, 45 M.J. at 395 (citing Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971).  (“[T]he right to free 
speech is not absolute, and some speech—e.g., dangerous speech, obscenity, or fighting 
words—is not protected by the First Amendment, regardless of the . . . status of the 
speaker.”)).
175. See generally Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447
U.S. 557 (1980). 
176. See generally Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004). 
177. MacBean, supra note 77. 
178. NATIONAL CLASSIFICATION CODE, supra note 49. 
179. Phillips, supra note 157. 
180. Henson’s website was innocuously rated, but was not necessarily “innocuous”
content.  Henson had previously been accused of using underage models in his work. 
The problem, however, is that the government failed to abide by its own rating system. 
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divulged that the blacklisting of Henson’s URL was an oversight attributed
to “a caching error in the system.”181  He also assured the public this was 
the only mishap of its kind.182  Critics often cite this incident as grounds
necessitating transparency.183  Regardless of who is responsible for the
improper censorship, the oversight could have been swiftly resolved, or 
prevented entirely by a transparent system.
VIII. INFRASTRUCTURE: A FOUNDATION OF COOPERATION AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY
As this Comment has explored, while democracies share similar 
legislative doctrines, they maintain numerous dissimilarities in
composition and community standards.  It is, therefore, impractical to pose 
an infrastructure for censorship that would be workable across borders. 
There are, however, some key attributes that all democratic administrations
should take into consideration when designating the infrastructure of 
their Internet regulatory policies.
A. Public Participation 
First, the public should have the ability to report websites they believe 
to contain material that would be determined unsuitable.  This requires 
that there be public access to the applicable standards, discussed further
in the “Publication Section” below.  Some level of public participation is
integral to a successful regulation scheme, although the manner in which
people file their complaints may fluctuate.  This participation should not 
constitute a final determination, but should serve as a mechanism that
enables citizens to report websites that may have been overlooked by the 
responsible reviewing entity.  There is no doubt that there are more Internet
users than there will ever be Internet regulators.  Therefore, it is both 
appropriate and efficient to enable users to participate in the infrastructure
of their own regulation policy if they come across content that may be 
inappropriately accessible. 
This essentially indicates that without transparency, the government could make 
arbitrary blocking decisions contrary to assurances made to the public.  Furthermore, this 
was not the only misclassification that caused alarm. See MacBean, supra note 77. 










     
   
 
  















      
 




It is important, at this stage, to involve the public and enable them to
report material that may have been overlooked.  Public participation 
contributes to public approval of a policy and has the potential to increase 
effectiveness; however, it should not impact the final determinations,
other than by bringing potential violations to the attention of the
reviewing entity. 
B. Reviewing Entity 
The reviewing entity is the party responsible for formulating the
blacklist by reviewing citizen reports, conducting independent 
investigations, and applying the law to the websites in question.  This
body should be akin to the ACMA in Australia or the IWF in the U.K.
They are also responsible for forwarding the blacklist of sites, determined to
be in contravention of the nation’s laws, to ISPs.
While it appears that more success and support has been generated for
the British policy of a reviewing entity that is not entitled to conduct 
independent investigations, this may not be a condition that all nations
should choose to follow.  To ensure that a regulatory scheme is effective, 
it may not be sufficient to entrust the public with the sole responsibility
of finding and reporting illegal and unsuitable content online.
Regardless of whether this entity is entitled to conduct independent 
investigations, it is imperative that there be a reviewing body or appeals 
system. This is particularly important in nations such as Australia,
which appear to have no plans to adopt a level of transparency in their 
blacklist compilations.184  Content publishers that are censored or
blocked must have some means of appealing a decision they believe to
have been made unfairly or in error.
Nations are likely to delegate the task of reviewing, applying offline 
laws, as well as the appeals process, to different organizations based on 
who they believe to be most capable.  It is important that regardless of
the organization or group formed to handle this task, that the group be
“disinterested.” They should not have obligations to any other group
that may impact or unfairly bias their decision making process.  Their 
job is to apply the law, apply the standards developed, and make a
determination based on those facts alone. 
C. ISP Cooperation 
The interactions between the organizations responsible for formulating
blacklists and the ISPs ultimately responsible implementing them, have 
184. Media Release, supra note 160. 
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become increasingly complex.  Some nations, such as Australia, have
attempted to mandate regulation legislatively, while other nations, such
as the U.K., have placed informal public and fiscal pressure on ISPs to 
comply.185  The U.S. has avoided mandating censorship legislatively, but
a recently proposed bill, the Combating Online Infringement and
Counterfeits Act (COICA),186 may drastically change the formerly
composed atmosphere.  This bill represents a hybrid of the proposed 
Australian and current British methods, which would mandate ISPs to 
block certain materials that directly violate offline copyright laws, and 
place pressure on ISPs to abide by a second set of blacklisted materials 
“dedicated to infringing activities.”187 
The complications that arise in deciding whether to mandate compliance
or encourage cooperation of ISPs have been observed in all three of the 
nations discussed in this comment. While no obvious solution exists, 
one thing is absolutely clear: The scope of these regulations may not 
exceed governmental authority.  If there is a clear basis in offline laws 
then legislative enactments are within the purview of governmental 
authority.  However, where the regulation does not have a clear and
convincing foundation in offline laws, democratic administrations cannot 
mandate the compliance of ISPs.  This is important not only to acquire 
legitimacy at home, but also to ensure that domestic censorship methods 
do not undermine global democratic endeavors to eliminate unjust
censorship policies implemented by repressive regimes abroad. 
D. Publication
The body responsible for enabling transparency in a regulation scheme 
is the government. ISPs complying with past censorship policies abroad
have been prohibited from publishing the list of websites placed on the
blacklist.188  Similarly, independent organizations and individuals that
have come into possession of these lists have been threatened that 
publication would result in criminal penalties.189
 185. Dudley-Nicholson, supra note 17; Fisher, supra note 18. 
186. S. 3804, 111th Cong. § 1 (2010); see also The COICA Internet Censorship and
Copyright Bill, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/coica (last visited
Sept. 6, 2011). 
187. S. 3804, supra note 186. 
188. Luft, supra note 75. 
189. Id. See also Luscombe, supra note 156. 
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However, publication is important because without transparency there 
is an absence of trust, and thus an absence of compliance and any
prospect for success. Julian Assange, the founder of Wikileaks, has 
justified his organization’s involvement in similar disclosures against the 
interests of the government by saying, “our goal is justice our method is 
transparency.”190  In order to prevent individuals and organizations from
seeking justice through unauthorized publication, the government must
accept that permitting transparency is a crucial element of a successful
Internet regulation policy.  In response to Conroy’s argument that
publication would lead people to seek access to the banned websites, so
long as the publication contains enough information for individuals to 
identify a legitimate basis for censorship,191 they have no reason to
attempt to access the URLs themselves, which they should be unable to 
do anyway.192 
IX. CONCLUSION
Meeting the requirements necessary to effectively implement an
Internet regulatory scheme in a democratic society hinges on acquiring 
public approval. As U.S. President Barack Obama stated, “[t]he more
freely information flows, the stronger the society becomes, because then 
citizens of countries around the world can hold their own governments 
accountable.”193  Acquiring the approval of a public that is freely
encouraged to rebuke policies that contravene their rights as citizens 
must begin with not just ensuring, but demonstrating the legitimacy,
transparency, and effectiveness of any such scheme.
There are very few who would argue that heinous crimes such as the 
possession and distribution of child pornography should be legal;
however, there are many who would fight against the implementation of 
policies aimed at censoring such content, in order to protect constitutional 
rights that may be residually infringed.194  Consequently, it is up to
democratic governments and their citizens to work together to strike a 
190. Interview by Hans Lysglimt with Julian Assange, Wikileaks Founder (July 30, 
2010), available at http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig11/assange2.1.1.html. 
191. For example, the approach taken in Saudi Arabia, which requires governments 
to identify why each specific site is blocked on the blockpage. See Villeneuve, supra
note 166. 
192. In other words, if the filtering system is effective, the “blocked sites” should be 
just that, blocked.
193. Obama Pushes China to Stop Censoring the Internet, NPR (Nov. 16, 2009),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=120450377 (quoting President
Obama in speech to Shanghai students). 
194. Corn-Revere, supra note 94. 
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balance between the most basic and necessary levels of censorship and
the inherently democratic rights of citizens. 
Citizens and organizations fighting against regulation, and governments
seeking to protect their citizens through regulation, must come together 
and recognize their common objectives in order to effectuate the changes 
they wish to see through mutual sacrifice.  Citizens must accept that a
minimum level of Internet filtration may be necessary for the government to
effectively perform the task of preventing and punishing illegal activities 
conducted online.  Similarly, the government must recognize the need 
for citizens to be both active participants and supporters of any such
policy.  Consequently, for a censorship scheme to succeed in a democratic
nation, it must withstand criticism and accountability, acquire a sufficient 
level of support and approval, maintain legitimacy through transparency 
and a valid foundation in offline laws, and effectively accomplish its
proclaimed goals. 
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